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Events for January 17, 2008

  • CS Colloquia: Bertrand Competition in Networks

    Thu, Jan 17, 2008 @ 11:00 AM - 12:30 PM

    Thomas Lord Department of Computer Science

    Conferences, Lectures, & Seminars


    Title: Bertrand Competition in NetworksSpeaker: Prof. Shuchi Chawla (Wisconsin)ABSTRACT:
    The Internet is a unique modern artifact given its sheer size and the
    number of its users. Given its continuing distributed and ad-hoc
    evolution, there have been growing concerns about the effectiveness of
    its current routing protocols in finding good routes and ensuring
    quality of service. Imposing congestion-based and QoS-based prices on
    traffic has been suggested as a way of combating the ills of this
    distributed growth and selfish use of resources. Unfortunately, the
    effectiveness of such approaches relies on the cooperation of the
    multiple entities implementing them, namely the ISPs or Internet
    service providers. The goals of the ISPs do not necessarily align with
    the social objectives of efficiency and quality of service; their
    primary objective is to maximize their own profit. It is therefore
    imperative to study the following question: given a large
    combinatorial market such as the Internet, suppose that the owners of
    resources selfishly price their product to maximize their own profit,
    and consumers selfishly purchase resources to maximize their own
    utility, how does this effect the functioning of the market as a
    whole?We study this problem in the context of a simple network pricing game,
    and analyze the performance of equilibria arising in this game as a
    function of the degree of competition in the game, the network
    topology, and the demand structure. Economists have traditionally
    studied such questions in single-item markets. It is well known, for
    example, that monopolies cause inefficiency in a market by charging
    high prices, whereas competition has the effect of driving prices down
    and operating efficiently. Our work extends the classical Bertrand
    model of competition from economics to the network setting. For
    example, we ask: is competition in a network enough to ensure
    efficient operation? does performance worsen as the number of
    monopolies grows? does the answer depend in an interesting way on the
    network topology and/or demand distribution? We provide tight bounds
    on the performance (efficiency) of the network.This is joint work with Tim Roughgarden.BIO:
    Shuchi Chawla is an assistant professor of Computer Science at
    University of Wisconsin - Madison. She received her PhD in 2005 from
    Carnegie Mellon University and her Bachelor of Technology degree from
    the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, India in 2000. Her research
    interests lie in theoretical computer science, with emphasis towards
    approximation algorithms, combinatorial optimization, and game theory.
    Shuchi is the recepient of an NSF CAREER award and an IBM Ph.D.
    fellowship.

    Location: Hughes Aircraft Electrical Engineering Center (EEB) - 248

    Audiences: Everyone Is Invited

    Contact: CS Colloquia

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  • CS Colloquia: Network Resilience to Attack and Disaster

    Thu, Jan 17, 2008 @ 03:30 PM - 05:00 PM

    Thomas Lord Department of Computer Science

    Conferences, Lectures, & Seminars


    Title: Network Resilience to Attack and DisasterSpeaker: Prof. Dan Rubenstein (Columbia)ABSTRACT:
    Traditional network design can compensate for a small number of node
    and link failures, but cannot handle attacks or failures on a massive
    scale. These massive-scale phenomena may be due to malicious behavior
    in the network, such as a denial of service attack, or due to
    disaster, such as an emergency sensor network deployed in a
    catastrophic location such as a fire or flood. A primary focus of our
    research has been to design or enhance routing protocols so that they
    are more resilient to these massive-scale challenges. The talk will
    first cover the Secure Overlay Services (SOS) architecture we proposed
    that utilizes network overlays to proactively protect targeted
    Internet sites from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
    Next, we will explore the problem of maximizing the amount of data
    that can be extracted to a base-station from a sensor network whose
    nodes are undergoing rapid failures. We develop a novel distributed
    network coding technique and demonstrate how, in a massive failure
    setting, our coding/routing technique outperforms prior state-of-the-art. I
    will finish the talk with a brief run-through of other projects that
    our lab has focused on.BIO:
    Dan Rubenstein is an Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering and
    Computer Science at Columbia University. He received a B.S. degree in
    mathematics from M.I.T., an M.A. in math from UCLA, and a PhD in computer
    science from University of Massachusetts, Amherst. His research interests are
    in network technologies, applications, and performance analysis, with a
    substantial emphasis on resilient and secure networking, distributed
    communication algorithms, and overlay technologies. He has received an NSF
    CAREER Award, an IBM Faculty Award, the Best Student Paper award from the ACM
    SIGMETRICS 2000 conference, and a Best Paper award from the IEEE ICNP 2003
    Conference.

    Location: Seaver Science Library (SSL) - 150

    Audiences: Everyone Is Invited

    Contact: CS Colloquia

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