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Events for April 21, 2015

  • CS Colloquium: Yasin Abbasi-Yadkori (Queensland University of Technology) - Planning and Learning in Sequential Decision ProblemsPlanning and Learning in Sequential Decision Problems

    Tue, Apr 21, 2015 @ 09:45 AM - 10:50 AM

    Thomas Lord Department of Computer Science

    Conferences, Lectures, & Seminars


    Speaker: Yasin Abbasi-Yadkori, Queensland University of Technology

    Talk Title: Planning and Learning in Sequential Decision Problems

    Series: CS Colloquium

    Abstract: Many decision problems have an interactive nature; the decision maker executes an action, receives feedback from the environment, and finally uses the feedback to improve the next decision. For instance, an Internet news recommendation system must make a recommendation based on the current visitor. The system then observes the click patterns of the visitor and can change its future recommendations. Such sequential decision problems are particularly challenging when the decision and state spaces are large, which is often the case in modern applications.

    In this talk, I will present my research in planning and learning in large sequential decision problems. I will consider three fundamental decision problems: problems with linear dynamics and quadratic losses (LQ problem); linear optimization with limited feedback (bandit problems); and policy optimization for large scale Markov decision processes. I will demonstrate a data-efficient adaptive controller and show the first finite-time performance guarantee for the LQ problem. For bandit problems, I will present an algorithm that can exploit sparsity in data. The improvement stems from the construction of smaller confidence sets. In particular, I will show the first sparsity confidence set for the linear regression problem. Finally, I will discuss convex optimization reductions for very general Markov decision (planning) problems. The reductions allow us to design computationally efficient algorithms that enjoy strong performance guarantees.

    The lecture will be available to stream HERE

    Host: Fei Sha

    More Info: https://bluejeans.com/866147590

    Location: Olin Hall of Engineering (OHE) - 132

    Audiences: Everyone Is Invited

    Contact: Assistant to CS chair

    Event Link: https://bluejeans.com/866147590

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  • Epstein Institute / ISE 651 Seminar Series

    Tue, Apr 21, 2015 @ 03:30 PM - 04:50 PM

    Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering

    Conferences, Lectures, & Seminars


    Speaker: Dr. Tinglong Dai, Assistant Professor of Operations Management, Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University

    Talk Title: Contracting for On-Time Delivery in the U.S. Influenza Vaccine Supply Chain

    Series: Epstein Institute Seminar Series

    Abstract: Motivated by the influenza vaccine industry, we study a supply chain contracting problem in the presence of uncertainties surrounding product design, delivery, and demand. In the supply chain, a retailer places an order before a flu season starts and a manufacturer decides on when to produce vaccines. Because production after a design freeze can result in late deliveries and hence lost sales, the manufacturer in practice initiates production prior to the design freeze at its own risk. However, since it is the retailer who reaps most benefits from selling more vaccines delivered on time, the manufacturer has little incentive to undertake at-risk production, which in turn induces the retailer to reduce the order size in anticipation of lost sales; and this further discourages the manufacturer from making efforts to improve its delivery performance. We proceed to show that the Delivery-time-dependent Quantity Flexibility (D-QF) contract, a contract adopted in practice, may not coordinate the supply chain due to the tension between overcoming double marginalization and incentivizing early production; another contract used in practice, the Late-Rebate (LR) contract, nearly coordinates the supply chain when demand uncertainty is low. We propose a Buyback-and-Late-Rebate (BLR) contract that combines buyback with rebate for late deliveries and can both coordinate the supply chain and provide flexibility of profit division. Our numerical analysis suggests that the total supply chain profits can be improved by over 10%, on average, compared with the contracts currently used in this industry.


    Biography: Tinglong Dai is an Assistant Professor of Operations Management at Carey Business School of the Johns Hopkins University. He received a Ph.D. in Operations Management / Robotics (2013), jointly offered by Tepper School of Business and the Robotics Institute of Carnegie Mellon University, with a dissertation entitled "Incentives in U.S. Healthcare Operations.” He also received an M.S. in Industrial Administration from Carnegie Mellon in 2009, an M.Phil. in Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in 2006, and a B.Eng. in Automation from Tongji University in 2004.

    Dr. Dai is the recipient of the 2012 POMS Best Paper in Healthcare Award, the 2012 INFORMS Pierskalla Runner Up Award for the Best Paper in Healthcare, and 2nd Place Award in the 2012 INFORMS Case and Teaching Materials Competition. He is a finalist in the 2014 Elwood S. Buffa Doctoral Dissertation Award, and the 2013 POMS College of Supply Chain Management Best Student Paper Competition. His research has been published in leading journals such as Management Science. He has been quoted in MedPageToday.com, Baltimore Sun, and Maryland Daily Record.

    His research areas include Healthcare Operations, Healthcare Supply Chain, Marketing-Operations Interfaces, Strategic Queueing Design, and Distributed Optimization.



    Host: Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering

    More Information: Seminar-Tinglong Dai.docx

    Location: Ethel Percy Andrus Gerontology Center (GER) - 206

    Audiences: Everyone Is Invited

    Contact: Georgia Lum

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  • ITP Game Industry Career Night

    ITP Game Industry Career Night

    Tue, Apr 21, 2015 @ 07:00 PM - 08:30 PM

    USC Viterbi School of Engineering, Viterbi School of Engineering Student Affairs

    Workshops & Infosessions


    You are invited to attend the ITP Game Industry Career Night! This event will feature a panel of highly accomplished professionals from the video game industry who are excited to answer your questions and share valuable career advice. Past speakers have come from companies such as Sega, Atari, Activision, Treyarch, Disney, Sony, Naughty Dog, and Electronic Arts.

    When: Tuesday, April 21st at 7:00-8:30 pm
    Where: RTH 211
    All students interested in learning about a career in the video game industry are welcome!

    Topics will include:
    -How to get into the video game industry
    -Past professional projects
    -Job application process
    -Potential career path options

    Come listen and network with video game professionals! Pizza will be provided!

    For questions, feel free to contact the ITP Advising office at itpadvising@usc.edu.

    More Information: VideoGameIndustryNight flyer.pdf

    Location: Ronald Tutor Hall of Engineering (RTH) - 211

    Audiences: Undergrad

    Contact: Alexandra Garabedian

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