Quantitative Methods for the Deterrence of Terrorists

Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering Seminarby Dr. Susan E. MartonosiAssistant Professor, Department of Mathematics, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CAABSTRACT: Many homeland security models focus on system reliability in the event of an attack and neglect deterrence: terrorists might choose not to attack, or might shift their focus to less desirable targets, if the costs of attack become too high relative to the benefits. I will present a model for resource allocation in which a defender must invest in protecting a target knowing that the attacker will either respond with heightened effort or give up. The optimal defender and attacker strategies are characterized, and we find that it is never optimal to leave the target undefended. Extensions to the allocation of resources to multiple targets will also be explored.THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2006,
GERONTOLOGY BUILDING (GER) ROOM 309,
2:00 – 3:00 PM

Location: Ethel Percy Andrus Gerontology Center (GER) - 309

Audiences: Everyone Is Invited

Contact: Georgia Lum