Models and Algorithms for Stackelberg Games with Incomplete Information

ISE 650 SEMINAR IN INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING: "Models and Algorithms for Stackelberg Games with Incomplete Information"Guest Speaker: Dr. Fernando OrdonezAssociate Professor, USC Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems EngineeringABSTRACT: Stackelberg games, where one player, the leader, selects its action first and the second player decides its optimal strategy knowing the actions of the leader is a natural problem for various security domains. This framework however assumes the leader has an accurate model of the adversary. In this work we have developed efficient mixed-integer programs and algorithms to solve situations where there is imperfect information about the adversary, its reward structure, or decision process.THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2008, 12:00-1:00 PM, GER 309BIO: Dr. Ordonez is an Associate Professor in the Industral and Systems Engineering department with a joint appointment in the Computer Science department at USC's Viterbi School of Engineering. His research focuses on convex optimization, robust optimization, complexity of algorithms, sensitivity analysis, condition number theory, and applications of optimization to engineering and management science. He received his BS and Mathematical Engineering degree, from the University of Chile in 1996 and 1997, respectively; and his Ph.D. in Opreations Research from MIT in 2002.

Location: Ethel Percy Andrus Gerontology Center (GER) - 309

Audiences: Everyone Is Invited

Contact: Georgia Lum